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Land Surveying in Early Pennsylvania
A Case Study in a Global Context
Abstract
By the end of the seventeenth century, Anglo-Americans on both sides of the Atlantic 
accepted the importance of surveying to any system of land ownership. Most histo-
rians of colonial British have similarly taken colonial surveying practices as a given. 
This article complicates these assumptions through an examination of Pennsylvania 
in a wider context. In fact, land policy in colonial Anglo-America differed significantly 
from practices elsewhere in the early modern world. English colonizers embraced a 
model of settler colonialism that created a market for land, thus encouraging the pro-
liferation of modern surveying practices.
Keywords
surveying – land distribution – Pennsylvania – settler colonialism – Anglo-America
Modern geometrical surveying practices emerged during the sixteenth 
century in Western Europe before spreading around the globe, allowing 
men with a modicum of mathematical skill to measure and record the 
dimensions of land-holdings accurately. Surveys appealed to governments 
and private landowners alike. By using comprehensive registers of surveys 
known as cadasters, govern-mental officials assessed the state of land 
ownership at a glance. Plat maps of individual surveys and cadastral maps of 
a region offered outside investors a tangible grasp for land purchases that 
was previously only enjoyed by locals. Over time, through public and 
private intervention, surveys helped break up and reduce the bewildering 
variety of medieval land tenures, so that individual landholders with clear 
ownership were more easily counted for taxation pur-poses. As a result, 
James C. Scott has argued that surveys principally served 
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“the tax official and the land speculator,” while local landholders tended to re-
sist surveys.1
As surveying developed into a tool of the state during the early modern era, 
a variety of empires expanded into sparsely settled territories in the Americas, 
Central Asia and elsewhere. In some cases, these newly conquered regions be-
came better surveyed than the mother country. In Scott’s words:
As a rule of thumb, cadastral mapping was earlier and more comprehen-
sive where a powerful central state could impose itself on a relatively 
weak civil society … It followed from the same logic that conquered colo-
nies ruled by fiat would often be cadastrally mapped before the metro-
politan nation that ordered it … Where the colony was a thinly populated 
settler-colony, as in North America or Australia, the obstacles to a thor-
ough, uniform cadastral grid were minimal.
While Scott’s assertion holds true for Australia and much of North America, 
surveying did not take powerful hold in many newly claimed regions. For ex-
ample, Spain, Portugal, Russia, and the Qing Dynasty managed to invade and 
occupy borderlands without recourse to surveying—although this began to 
change during the eighteenth century. So why did surveys become so impor-
tant in Anglo-America and what caused the other empires of the early modern 
period to eventually emulate this system? After all, surveys added a layer of bu-
reaucratic hassle to land distribution, and isolated backcountry surveyors had 
the opportunity and incentive to collude with speculators to deprive the gov-
ernment and its favorites of the best frontier lands. Why would governments 
bother with them?2
Using early Pennsylvania as a case study can demonstrate the differences in 
land policy between English-derived societies and the rest of the world. Eng-
lish colonists first settled Pennsylvania during the 1680s, long after the empire 
had established settler colonies elsewhere in America. Critically, Pennsylva-
nia’s first settlements took place after the Down Survey of Ireland, a compre-
hensive effort that surveyed and mapped Ireland during the 1650s. As a result, 
1 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1999), 11–52, quotation at 39; see also Roger 
J. P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of 
Property Mapping (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992). On surveying in colonial 
America, see Sarah S. Hughes, Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia 
(Richmond, Va.: Virginia Surveyors Foundation, 1979); J. Barry Love, The Colonial Surveyor in 
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Society of Land Surveyors, 2000).
2 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 49.
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William Penn considered surveys and maps as the centerpieces of his original 
colonization plan. After Penn’s death, the province’s colonial and early nation-
al governments continued to use surveys to regulate frontier land distribution 
throughout the eighteenth century.
Several related factors drove Pennsylvania’s reliance on surveys. By the 
time Pennsylvania developed, the English had already embraced a culture 
of quantification when it came to property ownership. Extended peace and 
good environmental conditions in the Mid-Atlantic drove an active land 
market for selling land to non-locals. Finally, rather than using its powerful 
central state to micro-manage affairs in the colonies, the English Empire 
decentralized authority overseas. In the case of Pennsylvania, the decentral-
ization of the English state allowed local elites to institute a well-regulated 
surveying regime.
The proprietors of Pennsylvania, the Penn family, derived their income 
primarily from selling land to the rapidly expanding settler population and a 
steady stream of newcomers from Europe. Their finances depended upon the 
price of Pennsylvanian land, which derived its value primarily from settlers’ 
improvements and from an owner’s ability to sell to newcomers and investors. 
Surveys gave landholders documents that made land claims legal and enticed 
sales to non-local speculators. While nobles in Europe resisted nationally man-
dated surveys and English officials overseeing other American colonies toler-
ated disorganized surveying regimes, the aristocratic William Penn and his 
descendants embraced a highly centralized surveying bureaucracy.
This article will compare and contrast Pennsylvania’s centralized surveying 
system with that of earlier English colonies in Virginia and New England. Lack-
ing individual proprietors, these areas decentralized surveying authority, re-
sulting in the practices of indiscriminate location and strict townships, respec-
tively. This essay will also consider the surveying and land distribution policies 
of a number of other early modern empires, including the American colonies 
of Spain and Portugal, the land-based empires of Russia and the Qing Dynasty, 
and islands under the control of the English and Dutch. With the exception of 
the Dutch, who were fellow early adopters of geometric surveying, the Eng-
lish used surveying technology as a tool for directing settlement far earlier 
and more extensively than other early modern empires. When combined with 
allowing considerable autonomy for its colonies to distribute profits from land 
sales, the English emphasis on creating a colonial land market made surveying 
a key technology.
The timing of Pennsylvania’s settlement allowed Penn and his successors 
to capitalize on the newly developed technology of geometric surveying. Dur-
ing the late Middle Ages, what the English called “surveys” emphasized land 
valuation not measurement. These surveys found and marked the internal and 
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external boundaries of the land, noting distinctions between improved and 
unimproved lands. Medieval “surveyors” often specialized in other agricultural 
or managerial duties. Surveyors recorded improvements such as buildings, 
wood lots, pastures, or arable fields, describing each improved tract in terms 
of specific crop patterns or general potential (inferior, mediocre, or superior 
land) and by giving it a concrete monetary value. Surveyors used an estate’s 
tenants as guides, because tenants knew both the best uses for certain lands 
and where the traditional boundaries between parcels lay. When perambulat-
ing the outside of a tract, surveyors took with them those tenants with the best 
memories of the land’s ancient uses, as well as young people, so that the mem-
ory of the land’s precise bounds stayed in the locals’ collective memory. Until 
the sixteenth century, surveyors considered measurements less important and 
often left them to their assistants.3
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, following the development 
of modern surveying techniques based on geometry and trigonometry, sur-
veyors evolved from legal experts into land measurers, a process completed 
throughout the English empire by the last half of the seventeenth century. 
Surveys still described and evaluated lands, but added accurate measurements 
of area. In place of descriptions of a variety of legal holdings, surveyors typi-
cally added plat maps to their surveys, which situated a graphical display of a 
landholding within its neighboring tracts. Over time, as English lords began 
to force peasants off of their lands as part of the enclosure movement, they 
found the new surveys useful to efficiently reapportion their property while 
erasing any reference to the rights of the previous tenants. While the English 
were relatively early adopters of surveying technology, they were not alone. 
The earliest Norwegian attempts at cadastral mapping began in 1514. Dutch 
officials began commissioning surveys and recording cadastral maps as reg-
isters during the 1530s. The Habsburgs surveyed their Milanese holdings in 
3 E. G. R. Taylor, “The Surveyor,” Economic History Review 17, no. 2 (1947): 121–133; D. Chilton, 
“Land Measurement in the Sixteenth Century,” Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 31, no. 1 
 (1957–58 and 1958–59): 111–129 at 112; Carol Rawcliffe and Susan Flower, “English Noblemen 
and Their Advisers: Consultation and Collaboration in the Later Middle Ages,” Journal of 
British Studies 25, no. 2 (April 1986): 157–177 at 160. On perambulation, see E. P. Thompson, 
Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: New York Press, 1993), 
99; John R. Stilgoe, “Jack-o’-lanterns to Surveyors: The Secularization of Landscape Boundar-
ies,” Environmental Review 1, no. 1 (1976): 14–30; Silvio A. Bedini, Thinkers and Tinkers: Early 
American Men of Science (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 56. For perambulation in 
colonial Brazil, see Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: 
Bahia, 1550–1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 291.
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1568.  German private landholders contracted surveys for their own properties 
during the sixteenth century.4
While modern surveying technology became well known during the ear-
ly modern period, some expanding empires chose not to employ geometric 
surveying as the foundation of their early land distribution systems. For ex-
ample, the Portuguese first settled Brazil using a policy known as capitanias 
hereditárias, which divided the country into fourteen fifty-league sections of 
coastline. In contrast to English practices, the boundaries between provinces 
extended along lines of latitude, without regarding the natural features of the 
interior. The government granted authority over each province to a captain, 
but a lack of apparent sources of revenue in the colony attracted few immi-
grants, and six of the captains never bothered to take control of their regions. 
The Portuguese abandoned this system in 1548, replacing it with grants of large 
tracts of land known as sesmarias. These grants to settlers were conditional 
upon the owner actually cultivating the land claimed, but few colonists had 
any interest in securing formal rights to land when it was plentiful and easy to 
occupy. The government made no attempts to monitor land claims. The ses-
marias failed to attract many new immigrants and Brazil’s colonial population 
remained small for centuries, only reaching three hundred thousand people 
by 1700.5
Similarly, most early colonists in Spanish America had little interest in se-
curing permanent land tenures. To gain vast fortunes, ambitious conquista-
dors needed access to labor, not just land. Spanish elites came to control plan-
tations through the encomienda system, a grant of control over local Indians 
that produced the side effect of giving the encomendero a large plantation on 
which to employ his labor. Spanish law prevented these men from fencing in 
their estates or preventing free passage through their lands. Private ownership 
to one’s own land extended only to ground put to agricultural use. Forests and 
4 For examples of plat maps, see Draughts of the Proprietary Manors in the Province of Penn-
sylvania, as Preserved in the Land Department of the Commonwealth, ed. William Henry Egle, 
(Harrisburg, Pa, 1895); J. A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450–1850 (Ham-
den, Ct.: Archon Books, 1977), 3–21; Robert C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 14–71; Kain and Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of 
the State, 11–24, 98, 123–125, 180–187.
5 Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller, Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The De-
velopment of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 33–34; Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in 
Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
140–148.
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waterways remained commons, while the crown reserved the right to mine the 
earth. This allowed the government to dominate the important silver trade.6
In contrast to the frontier-focused settlement patterns of Anglo-America, 
Spanish settlers preferred to move to a handful of well-developed cities. In 
a pattern established early in the sixteenth century and codified in 1573, the 
Spanish used surveyors to lay out their towns along rectilinear grids. At this 
time, Philip ii distributed a comprehensive series of questions to colonial of-
ficials to establish basic facts about his overseas possessions. Included in their 
answers, the crown wanted city maps, with thick descriptions of the topogra-
phy and quality of the local land. In recognition of the lack of a reliable popu-
lation of Spanish settlers in rural areas, the government promised large land 
grants to Spaniards willing to establish villages of thirty people or more. In 
return, the organizers would receive seven square miles of land (a fourth of the 
amount reserved for new villages).7
Despite this edict, centralized surveying regimes had little use in the Span-
ish American countryside. While the Spanish abandoned the encomienda sys-
tem in Central America during the sixteenth century, the government made no 
attempt to monitor landholding in rural areas until 1591, when the crown reas-
serted its rights to settlement fees throughout the Americas. Large landhold-
ers in Mexico who had encroached illegally upon the surrounding countryside 
could legitimate their unauthorized land holdings by paying the government 
a fine. This became known as composición. Government interest in land re-
mained sporadic, but between 1642 and 1645, the Spanish made another con-
certed effort to collect money from Mexican towns. Rather than paying for sur-
veying fees on top of the penalties for assessments, most communities opted 
to settle with the state before surveys began.
Landholders behaved similarly outside of Mexico. In the highlands of Gua-
temala, Spanish settlers encroached on Indian lands to establish ranches for 
sheep grazing during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Rather 
6 J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 35–41.
7 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 42–48. Robert C. Smith, “Colonial Towns of Spanish and 
Portuguese America,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 14, no. 4 (December 
1955): 3–12 at 3. On the 1573 order, see Karl W. Butzer, “From Columbus to Acosta: Science, 
Geography, and the New World,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82, no. 3 
(September 1992): 543–565 at 554–557. On Philip’s questions, see Howard F. Cline, “The Re-
laciones Geográficas of the Spanish Indies, 1577–1586,” Hispanic American Historical Review 
44, no. 3 (August 1964): 341–374. On land grants, see Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru 
(Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1955), 35–36.
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than secure grants for these lands, they seized much of the land in the region 
through composición. Taken as a whole, surveying played a marginal role in 
determining land distribution in Latin America.8
While the central government directly controlled land distribution systems 
in Portuguese and Spanish America, this was not always the case in the Eng-
lish Empire, where individual colonies retained greater autonomy. Despite the 
availability of the technology, geometric surveys did not regulate land distri-
bution in England’s earliest colonies. In Virginia, England’s first permanent 
American colony, colonists initially held the land in common, under the man-
agement of the Virginia Company. Ignorant about the local climate and geog-
raphy, they searched in vain for precious metals and attempted to establish 
various inappropriate industries, such as silk harvesting and winemaking. The 
colony failed to flourish until happening upon some lucky experimentation 
with Caribbean tobacco, which became the colony’s major export by 1616. In 
the years that followed, this sparked a brief yet intense mania, in which set-
tlers planted Jamestown’s public spaces with tobacco and spread out into the 
backcountry to clear land for more plantations.9
The economic windfall came too late for the Virginia Company, which chose 
to give up control over its landholdings in 1616. The company issued dividends 
to its investors in the form of undeveloped land. For the price of hiring a sur-
veyor (£12 10s), investors could receive fifty acres of land around Jamestown, 
with the promise of 150 more acres once the colony became larger. At the time, 
few investors had any interest in purchasing land in a colony with no clear 
revenue stream, especially as Virginia had no surveyor at the time. By 1618, the 
Virginia government changed its policy, so that immigrants who came before 
1616 would receive one hundred acres and later immigrants would receive fifty 
acres. Purchasers of Virginia Company stock would receive one hundred acres, 
plus fifty acres for each migrant shipped to Virginia.10
For fair and accurate land allocation, the colonists needed a surveying 
bureaucracy, but no surveyor arrived until 1621. Because settlement predated 
8 Francois Chevalier, trans. Alvin Eustis, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great 
Hacienda (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1963), 218, 266–273; W. George 
Lovell, “Landholding in Spanish Central America: Patterns of Ownership and Activity in 
the Cuchumatán Highlands of Guatemala, 1563–1821,” Transactions of the Institute of Brit-
ish Geographers 8, n.s., no. 2 (1983): 214–230. For Peruvian encomiendas, see Ford, Man and 
Land in Peru, 31–33.
9 Lorena S. Walsh, Motives of Honor, Pleasure & Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial 
Chesapeake, 1607–1763 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 1, 25–39.
10 Ibid, 30–39.
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surveying by nearly fifteen years, surveys needed to account for development 
that had already taken place on the ground. Years of expansion into the back-
country made establishing a regular grid pattern and laying out towns impos-
sible, so Virginians adopted the policy of indiscriminate location, in which 
settlers chose their own sites and the surveyor located the appropriate amount 
of acreage on the site of their choice.11
Indiscriminate location became traditional in Anglo-America’s southern 
colonies. This had the long-term effect of privileging plantation development 
and stunting the growth of towns and cities. Because settlers purchased plots 
of their own choosing, regardless of where they lay in relation to prior land 
holdings, they could avoid marginal regions and claim fertile lands along riv-
ers and streams. In contrast to a township system that would force settlers to 
live on marginal lands, settlement sprawled quickly toward the frontiers. The 
first entrants to a newly opened frontier area enjoyed a considerable advan-
tage over latecomers, because they could select the best lands in whatever con-
figuration they chose, without regard to the development of towns. Indiscrimi-
nate location therefore fostered inequalities in wealth, enriching those men 
lucky enough to enter a frontier region first, or already rich enough to pay local 
agents to reserve the best lands on their behalf.12
Unlike Virginia, the earliest colonists in New England initially intended 
to establish farming settlements. Like Virginia, settlers initially had little use 
for surveys. Prior to allowing individuals to settle in a locale, colonists in New 
England formed corporations that established townships by negotiating land 
purchases with Indians and setting aside lots. This system created tightly knit 
towns where residents supported churches and schools. Close neighbors could 
more easily engage in local politics and commerce, so settlers often chose to 
improve marginal lands within the township. This tended to limit disparities 
in wealth. All towns, however, hosted sizable minorities of landless settlers. In 
many towns a handful of prestigious families controlled the best plots of land, 
often while residing elsewhere.13
11 Sarah S. Hughes, Surveyors and Statesmen: Land Measuring in Colonial Virginia (Rich-
mond, Va.: The Virginia Surveyors Foundation and the Virginia Association of Surveyors, 
1979), 4–5.
12 On early American property distribution, see Edward T. Price, Dividing the Land: Early 
American Beginnings of Our Private Property Mosaic (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995).
13 John Frederick Martin, Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of 
New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991), especially 294–304. Over time, the pre-allocation of townships broke down in 
New England.
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In New England, land distribution devolved onto the local community. 
Locally elected selectmen perambulated township bounds, distributed new 
tracts of land as they saw fit, and mediated disputes. The town of Scituate in 
Plymouth Colony provides an example of how a small community could es-
chew surveying. Selectmen divvied up lands based on local reputations, so 
that the best quality lands went to the foremost men in the town. By dividing 
tracts along easily recognizable natural boundary markers and estimating the 
amount of acreage in each tract, the town could avoid the need for geometric 
surveys. During the 1630s, when a dispute over township lines with the neigh-
boring town of Hingham in Massachusetts Bay arose, the governors of the two 
colonies found natural landmarks to divide the towns: the aptly named Accord 
Pond and Bound Brook. As the town grew, the need occasionally arose to run 
straight lines through the woods as property boundaries, which the people did 
themselves. Only once during the seventeenth century, in 1649, did the towns-
people hire a mathematically trained surveyor to mediate intractable disputes 
over township lots. Beginning in 1683, townspeople again debated whether to 
hire a trained surveyor, but made no action to hire one until 1710.14
Both Virginia and New England evolved with extensive population pres-
sures and many examples of land speculation, but neither developed central-
ized land surveying schemes. In Europe, the English first implemented modern 
surveying techniques on a grand scale after the foundation of these colonies, 
following the conquest of Ireland in the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury. To assure the responsible redistribution of the devastated Irish lands, the 
government commissioned surveys to measure the whole island. During the 
1650s, beginning with the Gross and Civil Surveys and ending with William 
Petty’s comprehensive Down Survey, the English conducted the first effort that 
surveyed and mapped the whole of a European country. No other surveys be-
fore or after rivaled the Down Survey for its impact on England’s later imperial 
development. The surveys of Ireland created a useful map for the military in 
case of another war, and marked Catholic areas for later redistribution to Prot-
estants. The government intended to use eleven million acres of Irish land to 
pay bounties to thirty-five thousand soldiers and fifteen hundred adventurers 
who had financed their own expeditions.15
The Down Survey simultaneously measured and mapped Ireland while 
transforming the meaning of the land with technology. Surveyors not only 
14 Stilgoe, “Jack-o’-lanterns to Surveyors,” 23–29.
15 William J. Smyth, Map-making, Landscapes, and Memory: A Geography of Colonial and 
Early Modern Ireland, c. 1530–1750 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006), 165–188.
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noted a tract’s improvements, or whether it included mountains, bogs, forests, 
and fertile land, but also measured value in acres. This rendered varying topog-
raphies equivalent, even if their former owners had operated under distinct 
legal rights. With standard calculations, single lots could include both forests 
and meadows, or combine various tracts that natives had owned, leased, or 
held in common. Surveyors erased the medieval Irish emphasis on tradition-
al legal rights. In their place came maps and thick descriptions of property 
values. Among Europeans influenced by the Scientific Revolution, surveyors’ 
emphasis on mathematical accuracy made this new, abstract vision of land le-
gitimate. In Petty’s words, the country became “a white paper.” This view suited 
Ireland’s new English lords: expunging the land’s past strengthened the claims 
of its current conquerors.16
Ireland provided a model for effective surveying in North America, because 
soldiers controlled and redistributed native lands. Their efforts imbued colo-
nists with conceptions of land use and ownership informed by surveys and 
maps, leading to the introduction of a market economy that transformed the 
environment. In American colonies that began after the Down Survey, such as 
Pennsylvania, the settlement of Ireland affected both the organization and per-
sonnel for colonial surveying. Even in Maryland, a proprietary colony founded 
before the Down Survey, the Irish precedent affected land distribution policy. 
Maryland first appointed a surveyor general in 1634, but he left within a year, 
replaced by a man without formal training in surveying. Subsequent surveying 
in the colony was of mixed quality, but by 1683, the province reorganized its 
system to emulate the rigor of Ireland’s effective surveyors general, establish-
ing a central office with a surveyor general who made no surveys in the field 
and held clear lines of authority over deputy surveyors.17
Prior to establishing his colony, William Penn had already internalized the 
importance of surveys: as a landholder in Ireland, he had seen the benefit of 
the Down Survey firsthand. As an adult, he became friends with William Pet-
ty, and would have had access to Petty’s records and maps when visiting his 
house in 1667. While he never settled in America, Petty expressed early inter-
est in Penn’s colony by purchasing a five thousand-acre share in Pennsylva-
nia. With characteristic enthusiasm and exactness, he devised a plan to settle 
one thousand people on his acreage. Petty also concocted a similar scheme for 
the forty million acres he imagined Pennsylvania to contain. While neither of 
16 The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty, ed. Charles Henry Hull,  2 vols. (Cambridge, 
u.k., 1899), 1:9.
17 Mary Catherine Wilheit, “Colonial Surveyors in Southern Maryland” (Ph.D. diss., Texas 
A&M University, 2003), 19–57.
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these designs came to fruition, some of his proposals no doubt made their way 
to his friend Penn. Among Petty’s concerns for the colony, he warned against 
“Stragling plantations” like the ones that stretched inefficiently over Virginia’s 
landscape.18
While Penn had a grand vision for the civic and religious benefits that his 
colony might provide, he also needed the colony to yield a profit. In 1681, short-
ly after acquiring his colony, he quipped, “Though I desire to extend religious 
freedom, yet I want some recompense for my trouble.” In contrast to the origi-
nal Virginian colonists, he knew not to expect a sudden windfall from tropi-
cal crops or the discovery of precious metals. Instead, Penn planned to hold 
a monopoly on the colony’s lands and attract settlers that would buy or rent 
those lands, thereby providing his family with a long-term revenue stream. 
Like Petty, Penn imagined the New World as a tabula rasa with fungible acre-
age. Without ever stepping foot in the New World, he mapped out a rectilinear 
capital for his province, intending to sell land to adventurers at standard rates, 
sight unseen.19
To avoid leaving gaps of unsold land in the backcountry, Penn desired a 
township system like New England’s. For financing, he sought out investors to 
pay £10 for five hundred-acre shares in a village, with annual quitrents of one 
shilling per hundred acres. Individuals would receive fifty-acre lots inside the 
village and four hundred fifty acres outside the village. Penn stipulated that 
investors needed to settle their lands within three years. However, his need 
for funds compelled him to make exceptions to these land policies. To shore 
up his finances, Penn sold forty thousand acres to the Barbadian merchant 
Ralph Fretwell at a discounted rate. Many other settlers convinced surveyors 
to avoid marginal lands and apportion them dispersed lands of better qual-
ity. Wary of scaring away future revenues, Penn chose not to punish settlers 
who failed to settle their lands within the required time. His plans for Philadel-
phia also went awry: he had originally intended to enclose ten thousand acres 
18 The Papers of William Penn, ed. Mary Maples Dunn and Richard S. Dunn, 4 vols. (Philadel-
phia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 1:47, 101–107, 333–334; 2:130–131, 278–280, 
394–397, 651; 3:620–622; The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings of Sir William Petty, 
2 vols., ed. Marquis of Lansdowne (1927; New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967), 
2:95–121; Annals of Pennsylvania, from the Discovery of the Delaware, 1609–1682, ed. Samuel 
Hazard (Philadelphia, 1850), 643. Pennsylvania now contains almost thirty million acres, 
much of it mountainous.
19 Quoted in William Robert Shepherd, History of Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1896), 175. For examples of Penn’s promotional ma-
terial, e.g., Coleman’s Reprint of William Penn’s Original Proposal and Plan for the Founding 
& Building of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, America in 1683 (London, 1881).
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within Philadelphia, and grant ten acres of bonus land within the city to each 
of the first purchasers. He could not do so because settlers from the defunct 
colony of New Sweden already held farms along much of the best land on the 
Delaware. Instead, Penn’s commissioners laid out a two-mile square rectangle 
between the Delaware and the Schuylkill, approximately one-eighth the size 
Penn had intended.20
By 1685, Penn had sold over seven hundred thousand acres of the country-
side surrounding Philadelphia. However, no laws dictated that frontier territo-
ry needed to follow a regular township grid, so the township system languished 
when the province expanded. During the eighteenth century, instead of laying 
out township grids prior to settlement in the backcountry, surveyors left town-
ship bounds open-ended, stretching toward the province’s purchase lines, to 
allow for future sales. In theory, the Land Office required surveyors to sell land 
in these new townships in rectangular tracts, to ensure that townships filled up 
evenly, without gaps of empty land between straggling plantations. However, 
because of the enormous frontier, squatting abounded and legitimate buyers 
often avoided undesirable land, creating a checkerboard arrangement on the 
ground that resembled indiscriminate location. In lieu of numerous close-knit 
townships, the province laid out a few county towns as centers for trade and 
political activity. Even after centralizing and standardizing the surveying pro-
cess, Pennsylvania’s wilderness spaces and the Penns’ financial need for quick 
land sales prevented the transformation of the colony into a tabula rasa with 
a regular grid of townships. In effect, Pennsylvania blended the Virginian and 
New England approaches to land distribution.21
Penn was aware that he would base his fortune off of selling land that In-
dians already occupied. When he founded his province, bloody wars that pit-
ted whites against Indians had recently convulsed both New England and Vir-
ginia. Unlike earlier English officials who had operated at the beginning of 
20 For Penn’s early land sales, see ed. Jean R. Soderlund, William Penn and the Founding of 
Pennsylvania: a Documentary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1983), 58–91. For Penn’s early township plans, see ed. Albert Cook Myers, Narratives of 
Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware: 1630–1707 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 
1912), 263, 274–275. On early land speculation, see Gary B. Nash, Quakers and Politics: 
Pennsylvania, 1681–1726 (1968; Boston: Northeastern up, 1993), 90–94. On the first site of 
Philadelphia, see Dunn and Dunn, Papers of William Penn, 2: 334, 358–360.
21 Soderlund, William Penn, 72; Price, Dividing the Land, 257–283; Irma Corcoran, Thomas 
Holme, 1624–1695: Surveyor General of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, Pa.: Memoirs of the 
American Philosophical Society, 1992), 89–282; Love, Colonial Surveyor in Pennsylvania, 
114.
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the seventeenth century, Penn incorporated local Indians as early partners 
in his colonial enterprise, negotiating with them to purchase the land that 
he would sell to settlers. As time passed, the Penn family’s demands for In-
dian land became increasingly predatory. However, Pennsylvania benefitted 
from the English Empire’s Indian policies, which fostered close ties with the 
powerful Iroquois through the alliance known as the “Covenant Chain.” 
Despite living in the hinterlands of New York, the Iroquois pressured Penn-
sylvanian Indians into selling large tracts of land through treaties. As a re-
sult,  Pennsylvania gained lands, but experienced little violence until the 
mid-eighteenth century, when imperial crises with France became more 
pressing.22
Because provincial-level decision-makers determined surveying policies in 
the English empire, contrasting surveying systems developed on the Ameri-
can mainland. Elsewhere, surveying could be of less importance, depending 
on economic conditions. For example, despite its initial colonization having 
taken place after the completion of the Down Survey, English Jamaica had no 
proprietor, and therefore little incentive to establish complicated procedures 
for patenting land that might discourage immigration. Initially, no officials 
recorded land patents and islanders could take free possession of land. After 
1661, the royal governor limited land holdings to thirty acres of improvable 
land for every immigrant, charging quitrents to farms over one hundred acres 
worked by servants. This policy did not last long. By the 1670s, large plantations 
stretched across many parts of the island.23
Economic realities in other empires dictated differing levels of interest in 
surveys. In contrast to Jamaica, on the island of Ceylon, first settled by the 
Dutch East India Company during the 1630s, surveyors became integral to the 
22 Ned C. Landsman, Crossroads of Empire: The Middle Colonies in British North America 
(Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 41–44, 71–72. Penn communi-
cated with the Lenapes (later known as Delawares) prior to arriving in America in order 
to shore up his land claims against Maryland. Daniel Richter, however, points out Penn’s 
belief that “divine and civil authority alike made Pennsylvania legitimately his to enjoy,” 
Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 136–154 at 141. On peace with the Indian nations, see 
David L. Preston, The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the 
Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 117–
146; James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 19–224.
23 Veront M. Satchell, Hope Transformed: A Historical Sketch of the Hope Landscape, 
St. Andrew, Jamaica, 1660–1960 (Kingston, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 2012), 
44–48.
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local economy. They built roads and canals, made maps, and surveyed private 
plots of land in emulation of widespread practices in the Netherlands. By the 
mid-1700s, the Dutch employed ten surveyors in Ceylon, along with three in 
Java and one in the Cape Colony. In contrast, East Asian empires were hap-
py to rely on old surveys rather than undergo the expense of producing new 
ones. The Tokugawa shogunate did not order new surveys to update those of 
the 1590s until the severe drought and famine conditions of the 1640s. Simi-
larly, Qing Dynasty officials chose to use Ming Dynasty cadastral records for 
centuries rather than undergo the expense of a nationwide resurvey. As a re-
sult, Qing magistrates regularly ruled on “white contract” property disputes— 
properties held in technical violation of the law, lacking the official red seals of 
legally registered land.24
As time passed and peace continued, the Penn family’s financial distress 
caused them to press the frontiers of the province further to the west, exac-
erbating the territorial pressures on local Native Americans. While William 
Penn lived, the province did not extend far past the lower Delaware River, and 
never expanded beyond the original three counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, 
and Chester. Beginning in 1718, a series of land purchases vastly expanded the 
size of the province. By 1754, Pennsylvania theoretically controlled close to ten 
million acres.25
Among these purchases was one of the most infamous treaties in colo-
nial history, the “Walking Purchase.” Beginning in the late 1720s, Pennsylva-
nia had developed land in the far northern reaches of Bucks County, selling 
twenty-seven thousand acres to William Allen and other private investors and 
surveying one thousand acres at the forks of the Delaware River. By this time, 
Scots-Irish settlers had already squatted throughout much of the northern Del-
aware Valley, forcing the Penns to settle the frontier quickly, even if it meant 
24 Ian J. Barrow, Surveying and Mapping in Colonial Sri Lanka (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 24–28; Ian Jeffrey Barrow, “Surveying in Ceylon during the Nineteenth Cen-
tury,” Imago Mundi 55, no. 1 (2003): 81–96 at 81–83; Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, 
Climate and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2013), 489–499; Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 111–129; Jonathan K. Ocko and David Gilmartin, “State, Sovereignty, and the 
People: A Comparison of the “Rule of Law in China and India,” Journal of Asian Studies 68, 
no. 1 (February 2009): 55–100 at 75–76.
25 Donna Bingham Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records: A History and Guide for Research 
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1991), frontispiece; Richter, Trade, Land, 
Power, 155–169; Merrell, Into the American Woods.
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selling thousands of acres to speculators and thereby foregoing greater long-
term profits. Iroquois leaders based north of Pennsylvania agreed to cede both 
banks of the lower Susquehanna River and the area around the forks of the 
Delaware River in 1736. The land grab disturbed local Delaware and Shawnee 
Indians, but they lacked the military might to pose a threat to either the Penn-
sylvanians or the Iroquois.26
In 1737, Penn coerced Delaware leaders into recognizing an unsigned copy 
of a supposed 1686 agreement in which the Delawares had sold land between 
the Delaware River and Neshaminy Creek. The Penns had never surveyed the 
tract, which should have extended as far as a man might walk in a day and a 
half. After Delaware leaders reluctantly accepted the validity of the 1686 docu-
ment, Pennsylvanian officials made a farce of the agreement. Clearing a path 
through the woods, they sent three men to “walk” as quickly as possible over a 
day and a half, promising five hundred acres to the man who traveled farthest. 
The winner covered sixty miles by running in a northwesterly direction from 
the lower stretches of the Delaware. Rather than turning due east from the fur-
thest point their “walker” had covered, the Pennsylvania surveyors Benjamin 
Eastburn and Nicholas Scull turned ninety degrees to the northeast to close 
the tract off nearer the headwaters of the Delaware. Thus, the Walking Pur-
chase netted the province more than seven hundred thousand acres of land, 
far more than the Delawares could have imagined ceding.27
Aggressively making purchases allowed the Penns to accelerate the tempo 
of land sales, capitalizing on immigrants’ desires for cheap backcountry lands. 
By 1730, most of the lands within fifty miles of Philadelphia had a population 
density of more than twenty people per square mile. Exacerbating this need 
for land, a steady flow of English, German, and Scots-Irish immigrants led to 
an increase in Pennsylvania’s population from forty-nine thousand to 108,000 
in the years between 1730 and 1750.
Pennsylvania’s economic policy also encouraged land sales. Between 1724 
and 1756, the Pennsylvania government issued more than three thousand low 
interest loans for those who had collateral in the form of prior landholdings 
and wished to buy more land. Intended to help the general population and 
26 Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 318–324; 
A. D. Chidsey, Jr., “Easton Before the French and Indian War,” Pennsylvania History 2, no. 3 
(April 1935): 156–171 at 157–158.
27 Steven Craig Harper, Promised Land: Penn’s Holy Experiment, the Walking Purchase, and 
the Dispossession of Delawares, 1600–1763 (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 2006), 
46–71.
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alleviate the colony’s lack of hard currency, these loans mainly went to settlers 
seeking less than two hundred acres and less than £100.28
Other colonies’ land claims complicated the Penn family’s ambitions. The 
first major conflict arose over the province’s southern border with Maryland. 
During the 1730s, “Cresap’s War” flared up between settlers from both prov-
inces in a contested region west of the Susquehanna River. Both governments 
sent surveyors and militia to the region, but neither could gain the upper hand. 
A reprimand from the Crown led to a series of temporary boundaries between 
the two colonies until an official survey run by two English mathematicians, 
Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon.29
One significant difference between Pennsylvania and the earlier colonies 
remained: surveys for land sales in Pennsylvania remained centralized at a 
provincial level, rather than the county or township level. As the colony de-
veloped and the provincial frontiers expanded deeper into the interior of the 
continent, deputy surveyors hired in Philadelphia took on the responsibility of 
overseeing the distribution of distant lands for the benefit of the Penn family. 
Treaties affirmed in 1749 and 1754 gave the province control over most of the 
Susquehanna River to its forks. In 1768, as a result of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 
the “New Purchase” extended Pennsylvania’s sovereignty over most of the up-
per reaches of the Susquehanna, the West and North Branches. All the land in 
the New Purchase lay more than one hundred miles from Philadelphia, mak-
ing it vital for the deputies to understand their instructions and cooperate with 
one another.30
Typically, land purchasers in Pennsylvania underwent a multi-step process 
to receive paper titles to their claims. A prospective purchaser must first ap-
ply to the Land Office in Philadelphia for land. The Land Office would then 
issue a warrant to survey a given amount of land for that purchaser. A deputy 
surveyor would survey the land, and combine his survey with the warrant and 
28 James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern 
Pennsylvania (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 23, 42–51, 218–228; 
Mary M. Schweitzer, Custom and Contract: Household, Government, and the Economy 
in Colonial Pennsylvania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 114–167. German 
speakers came from a variety of property regimes that differed from the Pennsylvania 
system; Kain and Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State, 120–173.
29 Patrick Kehoe Spero, “Creating Pennsylvania: The Politics of the Frontier and the State, 
1682–1800” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2009), 116–171; Edwin Danson, Draw-
ing the Line: How Mason and Dixon Surveyed the Most Famous Border in America (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001).
30 Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records, frontispiece.
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the upfront fees to produce a return of survey. Prices varied somewhat, but 
in the mid-eighteenth century, one hundred acres of land usually cost fifteen 
pounds, ten shillings, half of which was due with the application. After re-
ceiving the return of survey and the remaining fees, the Land Office would 
issue a patent for the land to the purchaser, who could then settle after mak-
ing arrangements to pay annual quitrents and registering the deed with the 
county. Eventually, as the frontier stretched further away from Philadelphia, 
the likelihood increased that purchasers would squat upon and improve lands 
first before requesting an official application. Squatters could sell their im-
provements, such as clearings, fences, cabins and outbuildings, which could 
be worth up to ten times the purchase price. These sales often took place 
after  the squatter had attained a warrant but before formally patenting the 
land. Courts typically recognized squatters’ rights to first purchase of a tract 
of land if the squatter had “quiet possession” (uncontested use) of the claimed 
land for seven or more years.31
While squatting posed a major threat to governmental profits, the solution 
of allowing “quiet possession” purchases mirrored decisions made in other ear-
ly modern empires, like the Spanish practice of composición. The Russian gov-
ernment faced a similar problem with squatting, although nobles (rather than 
small farmers) tended to squat in Russia. During the sixteenth century, the 
Russian government attempted to compile cadastral records to determine the 
boundaries between the state’s land and private landholders. In many parts 
of that vast territory, local nobles had encroached upon the state’s land, farm-
ing it as their own. Lacking modern surveying techniques, Russian officials 
relied on local descriptions of boundaries, using descriptions such as the lim-
its of seasonal flooding or the distance that one could hear a neighbor’s herd 
of cows.32
Because Russian nobles opposed state intrusion into their affairs, the gov-
ernment only pursued a Western European style of surveying reluctantly. 
When it did turn to geometric surveys, the state measured state lands and town 
lands only, leaving locals to determine private ownership. Had it been other-
wise, the surveys would have offered a chance to regroup nobles’ splintered 
landholdings to maximize agricultural efficiency, as Western Europeans had 
done. However, the nobles distrusted one another too much to make a serious 
31 Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records, 40, 104; Schweitzer, Custom and Contract, 97–101.
32 Robert Givens, “To Measure and to Encroach: the Nobility and the Land Survey,” in ed. 
R.P. Bartlett, A.G. Cross, and Karen Rasmussen, Russia and the World of the Eighteenth 
Century (Columbus, O.: Slavica Publishers, 1988), 534.
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effort to imitate British or Dutch enclosure patterns. This was despite general 
dissatisfaction among many aristocrats with the layout of their estates, which 
often had overlapping landholdings across many regions.33
Russian surveys conducted during the eighteenth century failed to deter-
mine the exact extent of government landholding. The government abandoned 
a national survey conducted in 1754 after eight years of staunch  resistance from 
the nobility, without having completed the measurement of lands around 
Moscow. A more comprehensive survey began in 1766, measuring most of 
European Russia by 1796. The state only attempted to reassert control over its 
landholdings when local nobles encroached upon public lands in an egregious 
way. This discreet approach cemented a good relationship with the nobility. 
As a result, the state forfeited control over an estimated 135 million acres of 
land. This solution failed to bring money into the state’s coffers, but resembled 
decisions in Spanish America, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere. Governments 
eschewed surveys and land registration when they felt weak or unwilling to 
antagonize the populace.34
To ensure accurate surveys, English surveyors used a compass and standard-
ized chains to measure land. Developed by Edmund Gunter in 1620, the chain 
contained one hundred links of 7.92 inches apiece, with a brass ring placed 
at ten link increments. These rings made noticeable markers for intermediate 
lengths of the chain. Sixty-six feet in length, each chain extended four perches 
(or rods) of sixteen and a half feet. Eighty chain lengths made one mile, so 
ten square chains made one acre, greatly simplifying surveyors’ mathemati-
cal calculations. When measuring, the front carrier placed a pin in the ground 
at his position, which the rear carrier gathered. By using ten pins, surveyors 
had a convenient way to keep track of how far they had traveled. For shorter 
distances, they employed offset staffs ten links in length. Typically, surveyors 
employed local chain carriers, but took on the role of the rear chainman when 
necessary.35
Field books aided surveyors as they prepared their returns of survey, the of-
ficial documents needed to purchase land in early America. For example, on 
20 December 1760, John Lukens conducted a brief traverse survey on a field in 
southeastern Pennsylvania. For his own records, he noted his measurements 
in a small field book:
33 Isabel de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 134–135, 179; Givens, “To Measure and to Encroach,” 537–547.
34 Givens, “To Measure and to Encroach,” 534–543.
35 Richeson, English Land Measuring, 109; Love, Colonial Surveyor in Pennsylvania, 30–35.
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Survey for Thos. Craige Decem 20th 1760
a piece of Land part of his Fathers tract
Beginning at a Corner in the Road Thence S44   1 __ 2 W 112     
3
 __4   ps. Thence along
the Middle of the road N85   1 __ 4 W 20 and N78W 22 ps N26   
1 __ 2 E 60 ps Hick
Saplin Then N47   1 __ 2 W 10 ps Thence N26   
1 __ 2 E 81   
1 __ 2 ps post then S47   
1 __ 2 E 87   
4
 __ 10   to
the place of Beg Containing __
Lukens’s cramped handwriting, lack of punctuation, and sentence fragments 
spanning multiple lines typified these informal notes. In the above passage, 
Lukens described a resurvey that sectioned off a portion of a man’s land into 
a new parcel for his son, Thomas Craige. At the corner of the property begin-
ning in the middle of the road, Lukens wrote the compass bearing to the next 
corner: “S44   1 __ 2 W,” meaning forty-four and one-half degrees west of due south.
Using a chain, he recorded the length of the line between those two points in 
perches of sixteen and one-half feet: “112    3 __4   ps.” This process continued until he
completely enclosed the lot, identifying and marking the other corners (a hick-
ory sapling and a fence post) and logging bearings and lengths along the way.36
After finishing their field work, early American surveyors completed a re-
turn of survey, which contained the information in the field book, along with 
ownership details about the surveyed tract and its neighbors, possibly accom-
panied by a sketch or plat map of the property. The return of survey noted 
the acreage in the tract, which surveyors calculated from their notes. When 
surveyors did their jobs properly, the lines they ran around the lot closed, 
forming a solid tract. In Pennsylvania, the surveyor general checked his sur-
veyors’ math before approving returns of survey. Improper surveys resulted in 
settlers paying too much for their land or receiving more land than they had 
purchased.37
In 1711, the province established a regular set of fees for securing lands. After-
ward, surveying fees in Pennsylvania followed a general pattern, although the 
legislature adjusted the precise rates from time to time. By 1752, surveying up 
to one hundred acres cost seven shillings and sixpence. Every additional hun-
dred acres cost three shillings. Buyers paid surveyors two pence per mile for 
traveling and six shillings, sixpence for returning the survey to the land office. 
Chain carriers worked for three shillings per day. The Land Office collected five 
36 [John Lukens], Survey Book, 1760, John Lukens Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, Pa.
37 For a typical return of survey, see James Hamilton Jr., draught of survey of Northumber-
land lot for Jonathan Dickinson Serjeant, 21 May 1788, John Lukens Papers, American 
Philosophical Society.
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shillings to check whether a warrant for land was clear of other claims, and 
demanded nineteen shillings to file a return of survey on the property. Depu-
ty surveyors drew these fees in the field, and the surveyor general obtained a 
proportion of the funds they collected. At mid-century, the surveyor general 
received one-third of his deputies’ earnings. A deputy surveyor working part-
time might earn £30 or more per year in fees. While this would not be enough 
money to retire upon, most surveyors worked as craftsmen, and their earnings 
amounted to substantial secondary income.38
In a newly opened region, the Land Office accepted warrants for land pur-
chases, which the surveyor general then directed to his deputies, who techni-
cally had the sole responsibility for surveys conducted within their districts. 
The Penns’ official instructions illustrate their difficulties with corrupt depu-
ties. For example, Thomas Smith received a deputy surveyor’s commission in 
Cumberland County, in what is now central Pennsylvania, on 10 February 1769. 
Upon posting a £200 bond, he received lengthy and sometimes overlapping di-
rections from Richard and Thomas Penn, and from his immediate superior, Sur-
veyor General John Lukens. Based on the experiences of previous decades, these 
orders anticipated various deceptions that previous surveyors had  employed. 
In one directive, the Penns demanded that Smith employ only honest and well 
respected chain carriers who took an oath of impartiality before a local magis-
trate. This received specific mention because dishonest or careless chain carri-
ers could add or subtract large portions of land with measuring errors.39
To maximize their profits from quitrents and land sales, the Penns needed 
the province to settle evenly, without gaps of unsold ground. Left to choose 
their own tracts, settlers would avoid hills, stony soils, and pine barrens. 
To counteract this tendency, the Penns told Smith, “You shall lay out all Lands 
as regular and nearly contiguous as the places will bear, admit, or allow 
38 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, ed. Robert L. Cable, 18 vols. (Harris-
burg: 1896–1909), 2:331–348 (1711); 3:96–112 (1715); 3:367–380 (1723); 5:161–178 (1752); Love, 
Colonial Surveyor in Pennsylvania, 110, 123. For perspective, James Logan lived as a gentle-
man on £200 per year during the 1720s; Francis Jennings, “Incident at Tulpehocken,” Penn-
sylvania History 35, no. 4 (October 1968): 335–355 at 348. A pound equaled twenty shillings 
while a shilling equaled twelve pence.
39 Burton Alva Konkle, The Life and Times of Thomas Smith, 1745–1809: A Pennsylvania Mem-
ber of the Continental Congress (Philadelphia, Pa., 1904), 31–35. For similar commissions, 
see Deputy Surveyors’ Duplicate Commissions and Instructions, 1713–1848, Record Group 
17-xxi, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Pennsylvania State Archives, 
Harrisburg; Munger, Pennsylvania Land Records, 57–60.
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of, -- unless directed by ye warrant to the contrary.” The Penns combined this 
demand for rectangular tracts with orders that the surveyors set aside choice 
lands in proprietary manors reserved for their family. The family would hold one 
tenth of the province’s land in reserve until property prices rose in the future, 
securing their long-term financial interests. This tenth should have amounted 
to between two and three million acres. By the 1770s, however, the province’s 
deputies had only set aside six hundred thousand acres for manors.40
Ironically, the manors created the otherwise detestable gaps in settlement. 
Initially, the Penns hired overseers whose foremost duties involved prevent-
ing squatters from encroaching upon the manors. Many of the province’s most 
fertile lands remained empty out of fear that tenants might be difficult to evict 
and could deforest or otherwise devalue the property through bad manage-
ment. Widespread squatting in distant reaches of Pennsylvania frustrated 
these plans: for example, in 1730 Scots-Irish families illegally occupied the six-
teen thousand-acre Conestoga Manor in Lancaster County. While measures 
such as burning squatters’ cabins could deal with this problem temporarily, 
by the 1740s the Penns felt compelled to begin drawing up long-term leases for 
their manors.41
Often, the bounds of the proprietary manors remained murky enough to 
lead the authorities to suspect that the deputy surveyors profited by secretly 
selling manor land to settlers. The deputy surveyor Bartram Galbraith defend-
ed himself against this charge in 1763:
I have heard it roumerd that Mr. Steavenson of York, has acquainted the 
Proprietary Agents that the Proprietaries have lost some Hundreds of 
Pounds by me (& other Deputys) entering in within his Mannors with 
Surveys[.] If I ever have don aney such thing it must be unknown to me 
I have hitherto Strove to offitiate in my Trust with the Greatest diligence, 
40 Konkle, Thomas Smith, 32–33. On proprietary manors, see Price, Dividing the Land, 266; 
Schweitzer, Custom and Contract, 89–96, 102–109.
41 Schweitzer, Custom and Contract, 89–96, 102–109; William H. Kain, “The Penn Manorial 
System and the Manors of Springetsbury and Maske,” Pennsylvania History 10, no. 4 (Octo-
ber, 1943): 225–242; and Price, Dividing the Land, 266–267. On Conestoga Manor, see Willis 
L. Shirk, Jr., “Wright’s Ferry: A Glimpse into the Susquehanna Backcountry,” Pennsylva-
nia Magazine of History and Biography 120, no. 1/2 (January/April 1996): 61–88 at 66–67;
Charles Desmond Dutrizac, “Local Identity and Authority in a Disputed Hinterland: The
Pennsylvania-Maryland Border in the 1730s,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biogra-
phy 115, no. 1 (January 1991): 35–61 at 37; Egle, Draughts of the Proprietary Manors, preface.
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Care, & honesty, I was capable of. I can stand with my Face Uncov’red, my 
hands lifted, and Put mankind to thier Diffyance to charge me with bribry 
or Unjustice[.]
To circumvent further problems, the Penns instructed Smith to avoid sur-
veying on manor lands without a specific warrant, because tenants or buyers 
of manorial land needed express approval from Philadelphia. Lukens clarified 
that Smith would reserve proprietary manors on warrants dating to October 
1760. These backdated warrants would preempt any possible claims of prior 
improvement by squatters, even if they had illegally invaded Indian territory 
to establish their improvements before the New Purchase.42
The Penns’ vague demands for regular and contiguous settlements caused 
confusion among the deputies. For example, in February 1767, Galbraith wrote 
to Lukens from Lancaster County, having worked with a miller who intended 
to dam a creek. Galbraith wondered whether he might grant the man all his 
acreage along the streambed. Two years later, in Smith’s instructions, Lukens 
clarified what to do in this situation: “provided the ground will in any wise 
admit of it,” each tract of land on a river or creek should have a waterfront only 
one third as long as the property lines extending away at a right angle from the 
water. In this way, the first settlers in a bottomland could not monopolize it. If 
many separate homesteads could gain access to the water, settlers would in-
habit all usable lands, thus creating more profits from land sales and quitrents. 
However, Lukens also admitted the broken land might sometimes prevent his 
deputies from surveying regular, contiguous tracts in the Pennsylvania back-
country. Thus, his orders gave surveyors the wiggle room to accommodate set-
tlers seeking to acquire the best lands.43
Balancing between the need for rectangular plots and the need to avoid bro-
ken ground proved difficult, if not impossible, because warrants typically came 
to a surveyor with the acreage already entered. To provide the correct amount 
of acreage in a mountainous area, or one with pre-existing  neighbors, the sur-
vey had to trace an irregular shape across the landscape. Working near  the 
Maryland border in Lancaster County, deputy surveyor Samuel Blunston fol-
lowed the letter of the law, if not the spirit, by conducting his surveys on blank 
warrants and filling in the amount of acreage afterwards.44
42 Konkle, Thomas Smith, 32–34; Bartram Galbraith to John Lukens, 9 September 1763, Box 1, 
John Lukens Papers, University of Delaware Special Collections, Morris Library (hereinaf-
ter “jlud”), Newark, Del.
43 Bartram Galbraith to John Lukens, 27 February 1767, Box 1, jlud. Konkle, Thomas Smith, 
34–35.
44 Love, Colonial Surveyor in Pennsylvania, 114.
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Figure 1  Two proprietary manors that disregarded the normal rules for 
surveying bottomlands. Above: the Forks of the Ohio, surveyed in 
1769 (5,760 acres). Below: Penn’s Lodge, surveyed in 1770 (5,568 acres 
along Sewickley Creek; Draughts of the Proprietary Manors in the 
Province of Pennsylvania, as Preserved in the Land Department 
of the Commonwealth, ed. William Henry Egle (Harrisburg, 1895).
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Lukens and the Penns devoted by far the most space in Smith’s instructions 
to the proper division of labor in the Land Office, emphasizing that Smith 
could not survey without warrants from the surveyor general. Nor could he 
alter warrants in the field since this would have greatly disrupted the settle-
ment process directed from Philadelphia. They also requested that he not del-
egate his surveys to outside surveyors, and only make returns of survey “on the 
spot.” The Penns sought to avoid the problems that occurred when multiple 
surveyors did a single deputy surveyor’s work, confounding property lines out 
of ignorance or disregard of where other surveyors had previously worked.45
They beseeched Smith to return his surveys to Lukens’ Philadelphia office 
within six months of receiving them. If Smith could not execute the surveys, 
perhaps because he could not find the settler in question or the settler refused 
to pay the fees, he needed to explain his inaction in writing. The proprietors 
also forbade Smith from handing over any of his records to local settlers be-
fore the surveyor general received them. A settler who held his own surveying 
records could more easily cheat the Land Office. This could involve not paying 
for the land, but producing the survey anyway as an intention of purchasing 
the land when another prospective buyer wanted it. A cunning settler might 
even try to use the Pennsylvania survey as validation of a cheaper title from 
another colony. To circumvent this kind of deceit, Smith also had to collect 
surveying fees directly from settlers.46
Given the time constraints of the business and the lack of professionals in 
the field, mistakes could occur. To ensure reproducibility, the Penns required 
Smith to keep records of all his surveys and resurveys, including his field notes, 
so that the surveyor general might review his records. On request, he had to 
submit them to the surveyor general or to his successor as deputy surveyor. 
Lukens also asked Smith to name each tract that he surveyed. He intended 
for these names to dispel any bureaucratic confusion that might arise over in-
dividual tracts. In Smith’s case, his district lay more than two hundred miles 
from the capital, and he might reasonably expect to conduct his business for 
months without ever hearing from Lukens.47
Taken as a whole, the deputy surveyors’ notes convey the pitfalls in 
the Pennsylvanian property system: deputies could betray the interests 
of either the proprietors or the settlers by neglecting or delegating their 
duties,  by misallocating prime bottomlands or failing to prevent overlapping 




properties. Although land sales remained the primary means of gaining wealth 
from the colony, the proprietors relied on deputy surveyors to conduct their 
jobs on a commission basis, virtually without oversight. As Lukens warned 
Smith, “much will depend on the care & dispatch of the Deputy Surveyor, and 
I desire the people may not have any cause of complaint of your neglect-
ing their business.” If the people did have cause for complaint, it might take 
months for the surveyor general to become aware of it.48
Despite the Penns’ best intentions, efforts to meticulously regulate Penn-
sylvania’s surveying regime led to a point of diminishing returns. According to 
historian Mary Schweitzer’s estimates, “virtually half of the population” chose 
not to patent their lands formally until after the French and Indian War. The 
cumbersome, multi-step process of applying for and paying for surveys did not 
appeal to frontier settlers who had little to fear from the property claims of 
distant neighbors. Once the land became thickly settled and farmers needed 
to carefully subdivide their lands among heirs, legal documentation became 
more necessary. Even after the war, frontiers remained in Pennsylvania that 
attracted squatters. In the decade following the war’s conclusion, perhaps fifty 
thousand squatters descended upon the region around Pittsburgh, which both 
Pennsylvania and Virginia claimed.49
Elsewhere, other early modern governments recognized the limited ability 
for surveys to regulate marginal lands. Russia chose not to carefully allocate its 
frontier lands. By the 1760s, nobles could claim lands in the southern frontier 
zone as long as they could populate them with peasants. By the late eighteenth 
century, the government had sent tens of thousands of peasants to frontier 
areas near the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia without setting aside spe-
cial lands for them to farm. Surveying efforts in these newly acquired territo-
ries focused on maps for military use, with property surveys only beginning in 
the 1790s in a handful of settlements, such as Orenburg.50
Similarly, the Qing Dynasty spread its empire west into Central Asia  with-
out a centralized surveying regime. Surveyors had used advanced techniques 
48 Konkle, Thomas Smith, 35.
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in China at least as early as the thirteenth century, to direct the creation of 
irrigation projects. Nevertheless, the state had little use for surveyors, because 
it used surveys primarily to reassess regional taxes. Since the Chinese govern-
ment collected taxes through the Ming Dynasty system of quotas established 
in the sixteenth century, little incentive existed to conduct expensive new sur-
veys. Surveys could be inaccurate or corrupt, which would do little to raise rev-
enues, but still alienate local populations.51
In long held regions, Chinese policy adapted to local circumstances. In the 
recently pacified district of Sichuan, which insurgents had captured during the 
Wu Sangui Rebellion, the central government specifically forbade surveys for 
several decades during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Of-
ficials recognized that reevaluating taxes would create more conflict and likely 
distress many loyal military families that squatted illegally there. Later, during 
the 1780s and early 1790s, Chinese authorities potentially miscalculated by con-
ducting a lengthy cadastral survey in Shaanxi province to identify and root out 
illegally held properties. Similar efforts to crack down on organized crime led 
to the White Lotus Rebellion that began in the mid-1790s.52
Recognizing that local differences in economy and strategic vulnerability 
mattered, the Qing Dynasty adopted a multifaceted approach to surveying. At 
a national level, the Qing court embraced modern Western technologies as-
sociated with the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution. Twice, the court 
encouraged Jesuit surveying expeditions that resulted in comprehensive maps 
of China: initially from 1707 to 1717 and again between 1756 and 1758. Much of 
this interest in mapping corresponded to a Qing focus on understanding and 
defending its imperial borders. At the same time, in some newly conquered 
provinces, such as the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang, the govern-
ment agreed to conduct a survey of lands to establish a baseline for taxation, 
and military colonists carefully surveyed their land claims.53
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While Pennsylvanian land policy did not have to account for a political 
situation as precarious as that of the Qing Dynasty, the province had press-
ing strategic considerations of its own. In addition to the earlier conflict with 
Maryland, boundary disputes arose as the province expanded in the years after 
the French and Indian War, leading to Virginia’s occupation of the land sur-
rounding the Forks of the Ohio and Connecticut’s claims in Pennsylvania’s 
northern tier. Surveying itself could not settle these boundary disputes, as sur-
veyors could not operate at times when their governments lacked a monopoly 
on violence. The surveying lines only reinforced pre-existing agreements. To 
deal with Connecticut’s invasion, the Penn family chose to try to rapidly settle 
the contested region of the Wyoming Valley, lowering prices on choice manor 
lands and opening up the frontier to favored purchasers in the hope that set-
tlers with Pennsylvania titles would drive out their Yankee opposition (who 
held even cheaper land titles). Only the American Revolution prevented Penn-
sylvania from losing control over the region.54
Regardless of the vulnerabilities inherent in Pennsylvania’s system, large-
scale land speculations that failed to benefit the Penn family only occurred 
sporadically. In the opening decades of the 1700s, William Penn’s secretary 
James Logan availed himself and his partners of thousands of acres of choice 
lands without the knowledge of the Penns. Later, the New Purchase allowed 
the government to set aside twenty-four thousand acres as bounty land for of-
ficers who had served the province during the Seven Years War. Rather than 
locating this land in a single block, as required by the proprietors’ instructions, 
the deputy surveyor Samuel Maclay staked out multiple tracts across several 
fertile valleys. In a similar manipulation of the system, other speculators se-
cured forty-six separate land grants of up to five thousand acres before the land 
office opened the New Purchase to the public.55
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By the eighteenth century, the province had a firmly entrenched culture 
of surveying. Pennsylvania’s inhabitants internalized surveying as an obvious 
precondition for uncontested land ownership. While this culture was typi-
cally English, not all eighteenth-century English-speaking colonies embraced 
surveying equally. The last British colony founded on the mainland, Georgia, 
struggled to establish a regular surveying system. Georgia initially borrowed 
surveyors from South Carolina, then experimented briefly with a lottery sys-
tem for distributing land before relying on the more common Southern system 
of indiscriminate location.56
The naturalization of surveying practices also came late to many regions 
of Latin America. Only during the eighteenth century did the Spanish use 
surveys as part of an effort to modernize and rationalize its empire by map-
ping and documenting the resources of its frontier regions. The state ap-
preciation for surveying affected local practices as well. On the frontiers of 
North America, beginning in the 1730s, a series of long-lot surveys estab-
lished centrally planned, irrigation-based farms in New Mexico and Texas. 
Later, in the early nineteenth century, the surveyor general of West Florida 
conducted extensive mapping of that territory, including as yet uninhabited 
regions.57
Whereas Spanish Americans had primarily used surveys to order their cit-
ies, and eventually turned to surveying the frontier during the eighteenth cen-
tury, colonial Brazilians resisted the practice of surveying for as long as pos-
sible. Brazilian towns lacked central planning, and the government continued 
to dole out much of the colony’s land as sesmarias. The boundaries of these 
land grants were so vague that one historian wondered whether the govern-
ment liked it that way, to keep “Brazilian planters … busy plotting against each 
other rather than against the crown.” In 1796, the crown repealed a 1795 order 
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to measure and reorganize the sesmarias systematically, in recognition of the 
impossibility of the task. By this time, successful squatters along the frontiers 
of Minas Gerais could hold huge tracts for decades before claiming them as 
sesmarias, relegating surveys to the task of confirming the area claimed. The 
lack of organization in this system inevitably led to a series of land disputes. 
Even as late as 1843, so few competent surveyors worked in Brazil that the gov-
ernment abandoned an attempt to validate the boundaries of these tracts. As 
a matter of practice, following Brazilian independence in 1822, inhabitants 
could claim land by posse, or occupation. This policy lasted until 1850, leading 
to the growth of large estates occupied and defended by the wealthy. Only after 
1850 did the government demand official land purchases, meanwhile confirm-
ing all previous claims of occupation as legal.58
In 1688, the Englishman John Love began his surveying manual by writ-
ing, “It would be ridiculous, to go about praising an art that all mankind know 
they cannot live peaceably without.” He added that surveying was as old as the 
world, for how could anyone “set down to plant, without knowing some dis-
tinction and bounds of their land?” Even in ancient Egypt, “every rustic could 
measure his own land.”59
Love’s statement was inaccurate, but nevertheless revealing. While surveys 
had been common in the ancient world, including Egypt, the medieval world 
largely did without them. By 1688, surveys did regulate land distribution in 
England, although Love obscured the relative recentness of this phenomenon. 
Writing at the end of a revolution within his profession, he lent new surveying 
methods an aura of traditional authority. During the preceding century and a 
half, English lords had transformed millions of acres of unsurveyed medieval 
landholdings into lots fit for a commercial land market. Mathematical advanc-
es associated with the scientific revolution made deftly measured boundaries 
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between estates possible, and surveying became the preserve of technocrats, 
not legal experts.60
By the time Love wrote, surveys had also spread across the Atlantic to regu-
late land distribution in Anglo-America. English lords found surveys useful as 
a means for erasing traditional rights, whether those rights belonged to Eng-
lish peasants, the Irish, or Native Americans. Surveying could replace formerly 
tangled webs of ownership with clean lines, turning foreign, forbidding lands 
into “a white paper.” In settler colonies like Pennsylvania, governments could 
market surveyed lands to investors while simultaneously imposing order on 
the frontier. As Love knew, colonists often struggled with the mathematics of 
surveying, but needed to survey millions of acres anyway. This created a mar-
ket for comprehensive training manuals like the one he had written.61
But while men could not live peaceably without surveying in the English-
speaking world, this did not hold true for the other expansive empires of Love’s 
day. In frontier zones, surveying might discourage precious settlement or cost 
too much and improve taxation yields too little. Elsewhere, the government 
risked antagonizing local elites by pushing for exacting surveys. Landowners 
did not naturally clamor for survey-based patents, and only came to value 
them in countries like England, where documents supported land claims in 
court. Only over time, when the population had internalized the necessity 
for surveys, after the government felt powerful enough to assert the need for 
“progress,” did surveying become taken for granted.62
Pennsylvania was thus an outlier, an early adopter of surveying technology 
on a frontier. Its early settlement coincided with the widespread acceptance 
of surveys in England and followed the influential Down Survey of Ireland. 
Its peaceful relations with Native Americans, reinforced by the backing of the 
Iroquois, allowed the colony to take Indian lands with relatively little fear of 
violence. In turn, surveyors imposed a rough geometric grid upon the coun-
tryside, attracting settlers. Prospective European or non-local American buy-
ers could grasp the concept of purchasing lands that an expert could properly 
measure, assess, and map on a grid. Perhaps most importantly, the Penns faced 
little opposition from local elites. They were the local elites most affected by 
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surveys, and also the ones who desired them most. In many other early mod-
ern empires, preexisting landholdings in the hands of the powerful caused 
local resistance and could make surveys unattractive to the central govern-
ment. Ironically, England’s decentralized colonial schemes empowered local 
authorities like the Penns to embrace survey-based land distribution. This 
decentralization caused a more rapid embrace of surveying technology com-
pared to more centralized early modern empires.
